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UNIVERSITY OF 
COLORADO LAW REVIEW 
Volume 67, Number 1 1996 
REDISCOVERING USURY: AN ARGUMENT 
FOR LEGAL CONTROLS ON CREDIT CARD 
INTEREST RATES 
By VINCENT D. ROUGEAU· 
Men are qualified for civil liberty, in exact proportion to their 
disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; in 
proportion as their love to justice is above their rapacity . ... 
Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and 
appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, 
the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal 
constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be 
free. Their passions forge their fetters. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans are known around the world for their love of 
shopping and the abundance of material comforts in their lives. 
Washing machines, color televisions, video cassette recorders, 
microwave ovens, telephones, and automobiles are not considered 
luxuries for most Americans, regardless of income.2 American 
economic policy is heavily oriented toward consumption, and it is 
consumer spending, more often than not, that carries the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. A.B., 1985 Brown 
University; J.D., 1988 Harvard University. I am grateful for the comments and 
assistance offered by Mary Ann Glendon as I prepared this article for publication. I 
would like to thank my faculty colleagues at Loyola for offering helpful suggestions 
on earlier drafts of this article, especially Patrick McFadden, Neil Williams, and Alan 
Raphael. I would also like to thank Neal Erlenborn and Charles Matoesian for their 
invaluable research assistance. 
1. EDMUND BURKE, LETl'ER TO A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL AsSEMBLY (1791), 
reprinted in VII THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE: THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 1790·1794, at 332 (L.G. Mitchell ed., 1989). 
2. In 1987, at least two-thirds of American households had washing machines, 
color televisions, and microwaves. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: 
THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 111-12 (1991). 
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 2 1996
2 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
economy in and out of economic recessions.3 Over the last twenty 
years, various sectors of the American economy have been 
deregulated under the assumption that free markets, unfettered 
by burdensome government regulation, would produce increased 
competition and greater economic efficiency. A more efficient 
economy would produce more and better goods at lower prices, 
which would increase consumption and make the nation wealth-
ier and thus ''better off." During the same period, the economic 
theories that spawned deregulation increasingly found their way 
into aspects of American life beyond the traditional economic 
sphere. In a culturally contentious society faced with the 
demands of an increasingly global economy, the "rational" and 
purportedly "value-neutral" arguments of the market found 
widespread legitimacy as the language of fairness, reason, and 
material progress. At the same time, however, the legal and 
cultural constraints on free-market ideas that traditionally had 
been used to temper the effects of economic activity in order to fit 
it within a broader social context were increasingly marginalized. 
This article explores the specific question of setting a legal 
maximum for credit card interest rates. There has been extensive 
discussion in the popular press of the explosion of credit card use 
and the extraordinarily high interest rates people are willing to 
. pay, through various fees and interest charges, to use them. 
Classic free-market economic arguments have been used to 
prevent the imposition of a federal cap on credit card interest 
rates, but there is strong evidence that economic models inade-
quately explain the credit card market and that a lack of interest 
rate controls has produced a dramatic transfer of wealth from 
consumers to the major credit card issuers, most of which are 
large national banks.4 I argue that this absence of regulation, 
3. Close to two-thirds of the nation's gross domestic product ("GDP') is made up 
of personal consumption expenditures. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 446 (1l4th Ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The total GDP in 1993 (in constant 1987 dollars) was $5,136 
billion, $3,453.2 billion of which was devoted to personal consumption. [d. 
4. The ten largest credit card issuers in the United States are, in rank order: (1) 
Citicorp; (2) Sears Discover; (3) Chase Manhattan; (4) MBNA America; (5) First 
Chicago; (6) Bank of America; (7) AT&T Universal; (8) Chemical Bank; (9) Household 
Bank; and (10) Bank of New York. GENERAL ACCT. OFFICE, U.S. CREDIT CARD 
INDUSTRy-COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENTS NEED To BE CLOSELY MONITORED, 
GAO/GGD 94-23, 20-21 (Apr. 28, 1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. At a symposium 
on bankruptcy law and financial institutions, which was part of the Fifth Annual 
Lawyers Convention sponsored by the Federalist Society at Cornell Law School in 
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which relies primarily on traditional liberal economic arguments 
for support, either (1) ignores the irrational nature of a consumer 
culture and promotes an extremely limited view of what is good 
social and economic policy, or (2) understands the irrational 
nature of consumers all too well and is designed to confer special 
benefits on the lenders of money. The result is a legal policy that 
promotes consumption and acquisitiveness and encourages 
behavior, such as greed, that the culture has traditionally labeled 
undesirable. Mter I observe the "real world" activity of a large 
number of credit card holders and examine effects this prevailing 
legal regime has had on consumers, I make two major arguments. 
First, allowing the market alone to set interest rates on credit 
cards is a one-sided legal policy that promotes consumption and 
debt among consumers, while producing unusually high profits 
for credit card issuers. Moreover, adherence to this one-sided 
policy has allowed the law to become a tool of the special interests 
that benefit from the promotion of high consumer debt and 
consumption. Second, the establishment of realistic interest rate 
controls in the credit card market would be preferable to the 
present system for two important reasons: (1) as a legal policy, 
interest rate controls more fairly balance the interests of consum-
ers and credit card issuers than the current laissez-faire policy; 
and (2) the market is not an. entity that exists separately from the 
larger cultural values and traditions of our society. Usury laws 
have been used throughout history to exercise social control over 
economic relationships that, unchecked, tend to degenerate into 
exploitation and other socially counterproductive behavior. 
Part I of this article examines the current state of the credit 
card industry and reviews the major legislative and judicial 
developments over the last twenty years that effectively have 
deregulated credit card interest rates. Part II explores the 
economic arguments against interest rate regulation and 
examines important weaknesses in these arguments as they 
apply to the credit card market. Part III presents challenges to 
some of the accepted economic arguments supporting deregula-
tion and raises some additional arguments concerning the 
1992, Professor Elizabeth Warren of the University of Pennsylvania noted that huge 
profits on credit cards were saving some of the nation's largest banks from financial 
disaster. Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1093 (1992). Losses from bad loans to developing countries and poor real-estate 
lending were being covered by credit card profits. Id. 
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negative effects of a lack of interest rate controls on credit cards. 
Finally, Part IV offers some general observations about reforming 
the credit card market and argues that reasonable interest rate 
controls, although they may tend to restrict the amount of credit 
available, are essential because they help to keep market 
interactions in line with important values of the larger culture. 
I. THE GROWTH OF THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY AND 
INTEREST RATE DEREGULATION 
A. The Growth of the Credit Card Industry 
Credit cards have revolutionized the way Americans live and 
how they spend their money.5 In the United States, large 
retailers were the first to issue the "charga-plates" that eventu-
ally became the credit cards oftoday.6 Charga-plates, which first 
appeared in the late 1920s, resembled military dogtags and were 
issued to a store's better customers to allow them to post pur-
chases to a store account.? Today, retailers still form an impor-
tant part of the credit card market, but it is the third-party 
universal card that is now preeminent. First created by Diner's 
Club in 1949, the universal card was accepted in a variety of 
places and used a third party to extend credit to the customer and 
5. For the purposes of this article. I define credit cards as those cards that allow 
an account holder to make retail purchases by presenting the card to a merchant who 
will be paid by the issuer of the card. The account holder will then receive a 
statement from the card issuer detailing the purchases that were made during the 
statement period. The statement can be paid upon receipt (in many cases there is a 
"grace" period of 25 to 30 days) and no interest charges will accrue or a small 
payment may be made (typically 2.5% of the outstanding balance) to keep the account 
current. The remaining amount is deducted from the cardholder's line of credit and 
the unpaid amount may be paid at the cardholder's convenience. Interest charges 
accrue on this unpaid balance until it has been repaid. Banks are the major issuers 
of credit cards today, but department stores and other retailers also make up a large 
part of the market. There is an important distinction between credit cards and debit 
cards. Debit cards are linked to an account at a financial institution and the money 
necessary to cover a purchase is subtracted from the account as the purchases are 
made. Thus a debit card is not a means for extending credit. In most other respects, 
however, they are indistinguishable from credit cards. 
6. Oil companies and, later, airlines began issuing plates during the same period 
for fuel and travel. LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY xii 
(1990). Mandell makes extensive use of the Nilson Report, which is a monthly 
publication that chronicles developments in the credit card industry. 
7. Id. at xiii. 
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to pay the merchant.s American Express soon followed Diner's 
Club into the market with a competing universal card, and it 
remains a dominant force in the credit card market today. The 
vast majority of universal credit cards, however, are now issued 
by banks and carry the logo of ''VISA'' or "MasterCard".9 
Once a consumer makes an initial application for a credit 
card and the application is accepted, she need never again suffer 
the indignity of having her credit history reviewed or her 
spending patterns scrutinized by the card issuer. In fact, the 
approval process for many credit cards is often almost automatic, 
with only those with the worst credit ratings being turned away.lO 
Consequently, while early credit cards were essentially a privi-
lege for the wealthy or businessmen on expense accounts, credit 
card use among Americans today is widespread in all socio-
economic groups.ll Increasing the amount one is eligible to 
borrow (that is, one's "credit line" or "credit limit") often requires 
nothing more than a telephone call and, in many cases, the card 
issuer will increase the credit limit without solicitation. Thus, 
purchases that thirty years ago would have required for most 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 26, 51. Of the $539 billion in credit card spending in the United States 
in 1992, approximately $390 billion was spent on bank, travel, and entertainment 
cards. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 522. The overwhelming majority of 
the remaining spending was on cards issued by department stores. Id. 
10. Department stores are notorious for extending "instant credit" and often 
offer discounts on purchases at the point of sale if the customer agrees to accept a 
charge account with the retailer. In many instances, it is not even necessary to have 
a job or a credit history in order to receive a credit card. Indeed, a substantial portion 
of credit card marketing is directed at those with poor credit ratings, or those with 
no credit rating at all. Most American cities are filled with advertising on public 
transportation directed at these consumers ("Bad Credit? No Credit? We have a Visa 
card just for you!''). Some of these cards must be secured with a cash payment, but 
many do not have such a requirement. High interest rates are generally used to 
compensate lenders for any increased risk. College and graduate students, who more 
often than not have no credit history and no regular source of income, are heavily 
solicited. For a more complete discussion of credit card marketing among high school 
and university students, see infra notes 118-125 and accompanying text. 
11. In 1989, 68% of all U.S. households had some type of credit card (e.g., bank, 
store, gasoline). Glenn B. Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Developments in the Pricing 
of Credit Card Services, 78 FEn. RESERVE BULL. 652, 656 (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter 
Credit Card Study]. The only income group in which less than 50% of the families 
had credit cards (30%) was the one in which incomes were below $10,000 per year. 
Id. at 656. Notably, that income group is well below the official poverty line, which 
in 1989 was $12,674 for a family of four. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 475. 
In families earning more than $50,000 per year, 95% had credit cards, and the mean 
number of accounts for all families was 5.6. Credit Card Study, supra, at 656. 
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Americans months of saving or an uncomfortable meeting with a 
loan officer at a bank or thrift institution are now made instantly, 
simply by presenting a plastic card.12 
Of the top fIfty credit card issuers in the United States, 
thirty-seven are banking or thrift institutions.13 The remaining 
thirteen companies are large diversifIed corporations such as 
Sears, AT&T, and American Express.14 The top fIfty issuers of 
credit cards control close to 75% of the credit card market, but the 
real market power rests with the top twenty-fIve who control 65% 
of the credit card marketplace. IS Mter struggling during the 
1960s and 1970s, consumers' credit card use and banks' profIts 
from credit card operations exploded during the 1980s.16 In 1989, 
people in more than 54% of American households had credit 
cards; at the same time, credit cards have become the most 
profItable aspect of the banking business.17 
Credit cards have moved the United States inexorably toward 
the "cashless society" envisioned as the wave of the future since 
the nineteenth century. IS They have become such an important 
12. Apart from the economic changes credit card use has promoted, it is 
important to note the social and cultural changes that have occurred at the same 
time. When credit card companies were soliciting widely in the early 1970s, they 
found it very difficult to earn profits because most of their customers, generally 70% 
to 80%, paid their balances before they accrued interest. MANDELL, supra note 6, at 
71. This situation has practically reversed itself today. See infra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
13. Mickey Meese & L. Michael Cacace, Nonbanks Gain Ground in the Credit 
Card Race Series, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 1993 at 1. 
14. Id. at 1·3. 
15. Id. at 2. The top ten issuers of credit cards control 57% of the market. GAO 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 20·21. 
16. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. 
17. The credit card business was tremendously profitable throughout most of the 
1980s, with returns on assets that far exceeded those for other areas of the banking 
business. See generally Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the 
Credit Card Market, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1991, at 50, 56-64. This high level of 
profitability has continued in the 1990s. See Banking Industry Reaps Credit Card 
Profits, CARDFAX, Apr. 4,1994; Competition: The Credit Card Industry Rides a Wave 
of Profitability, 24 CREDIT CARD NEWS 6, April 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 
CRCDNS database. 
18. In the 1880s, Edward Bellamy predicted that the demonetization of gold and 
its abandonment as a medium of exchange would bring about a new, less materialistic 
age. He used the year .2000 as his benchmark for the new era. EDWARD BELLAMY, 
LOOKING BACKWARD: 2000-1887 (Signet Classic, 1960) (1887). By the 1960s and 
1970s economic scholars were convinced that, at least in wealthy industrialized states 
of the world, the cashless society was indeed becoming a reality. See generally 
ROBERT A. HENDRICKSON, THE CASHLESS SOCIETY (1972). Hendrickson saw the 
disappearance of a cash economy as a positive development, decreasing opportunities 
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part of everyday life in this country that it can be quite difficult 
to conduct one's affairs without them.19 But easy, unsecured 
credit has never come cheap. The price the typical American 
credit card holder pays for all of this convenience is extremely 
high. Most credit cards carry an annual fee, ranging from $15 to 
$40 (and as high as $300 for certain prestige cards).20. Americans 
carry an average outstanding balance of $1,700 on a typical credit 
card at an average interest rate of 17.66%.21 It is, of course, 
for fraud and furthering the creation of an efficient international economy. Id. at 
223-45. For most transactions, he suggested a single national credit card for each 
American under the supervision of the Federal Reserve or a central credit 
administration. Id. at 234-40. Special tokens or coins would be issued for small 
transactions and for tolls and vending machines. Id. at 235. Of course, in 1994, we 
already have systems in place that will eliminate the need for cash in those areas as 
well. Plans are well underway to introduce "electronic purses" to consumers 
throughout the United States. These wallet·sized cards are embedded with 
rechargeable microchips that store sums of money and are designed to compete with 
cash for transactions under twenty dollars. See, Saul Hansell, An End to the 
"Nightmare" of Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1994, at D1. 
19. Credit cards are required as security for renting so many items, such as cars, 
hotel rooms, and movies, that it would be impossible to list them all. One could of 
course use cash as security, but most people find this risky and inconvenient for 
obvious reasons. Mter a purchase has been made, credit cards also allow for easier 
returns and refunds. In printed testimony submitted to the House Subcommittee on 
Consumer Credit and Insurance in March 1994, Visa, U.S.A., stated that "[ilt is 
impossible in today's world to order merchandise by mail, rent a car, buy an airline 
ticket, or do many routine things without a plastic payment card of some kind." . 
Bankcards and the College Market: Hearings Testimony Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban 
Affairs, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (l\1ar. 10, 1994). Even grocery stores now accept credit 
cards, which would have been unheard of just a few years ago. Gary Levin, Credit 
Cards Bagging More Grocery Sales, ADvERTISING AGE, Jan. 4, 1993, at 12. The idea 
of paying for the necessities of life with a credit card (or on credit) conjures up images 
of a descent into inescapable debt, and consumer advocates have been quite 
concerned about this new development in credit card use. Andrew Leckey, Think 
Twice Before Charging Grocery Items, ST. LoUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 1994, at 
13D. 
20. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE, REPORT ON THE TERMS OF CREDIT CARD PLANS, Sept. 12, 1994. 
Information collected from a large cross section of the bank issuers of credit cards 
every six months by the Federal Reserve indicates that as of September 1994, only 
45 of 149 issuers surveyed, or approximately 30%, offer cards with no annual fee. Id. 
While preparing this article, I received two solicitations for the American Express 
Platinum Card. The card provides numerous benefits and services and carries a 
yearly fee of $300. 
21. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Americans Buying More On Credit, N.Y. TIMES, July 
30, 1994, at 33. The 17.66% figure is for bank cards, which comprise most of the 
credit card market. Id. There were many new cards with lower rates introduced 
during the past few years and many of those rates are tied to the prime rate. GAO 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. For example, in March, 1993, 63 of 152 card issuers 
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possible to avoid interest rate charges on credit cards by paying 
off the balance every month, but the vast majority of credit card 
holders do not, or can not, do this.22 In 1992, the amount of credit 
card debt outstanding ",:,as $273 billion, which compares to credit 
card spending of $539 billion in the same year; credit card debt is 
expected to rise to $436.8 billion and credit card spending to rise 
to $1,004 billion by the year 2000.23 Despite a growing number of 
credit card issuers entering the business and an almost constant 
introduction of new types of cards, the credit card business 
remains extremely lucrative.24 
When a credit card is used to make a purchase, the card-
holder has received an unsecured loan from the card issuer. 
Interest could accrue immediately, but under most credit card 
agreements there is a "grace period" of 25-30 days during which 
no interest is owed.25 Borrowing money without security is 
almost always more expensive than when a loan is secured by 
some form of collateral, because the lender is relying only on the 
borrower's legally binding promise to pay as a guarantee of 
repayment. Higher interest rates compensate the lender for the 
higher risk of borrower default. From the colonial era through 
the 1970s, most states controlled interest rates on unsecured 
consumer loans, but by the late 1970s, due to high inflation and 
extremely high interest rates for money in commercial markets, 
reporting to the Federal Reserve, or approximately 40%, charged a variable rate. 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE, REPORT ON THE TERMS OF CREDIT CARD, Mar. 15, 1993. By 
September, 1994, the numbers had changed to 90 of 149 reporting, or approximately 
60%. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE, REPORT ON THE TERMS OF CREDIT CARD, Sept. 12, 1994. 
22. Close to 70% of all credit card holders maintain outstanding balances. 
Hershey, supra note 21, at 33. A general rule of thumb in the credit card industry is 
that 90% of an issuer's outstanding balances accrue interest. Ausubel, supra note 17, 
at 58 n.20. Of course, these payments could range from just a few dollars a year to 
several hundred or more. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve has found that 
consumers tend to overstate the number of times they pay their bills in full. Credit 
Card Study, supra note 11, at 663. 
23. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 522. 
24. In 1993, the banking industry's profit was a record $43.4 billion. 
Competition: The Credit Card Industry Rides a Wave of Profitability, supra note 17. 
Visa and MasterCard card profits totaled $4.4 billion after taxes in 1993, up from $3.4 
billion in 1992. Id. Credit card returns on assets were 2.3% in 1993 and 2.0% in 
1992, which is about twice as high a rate of return on assets as that of the banking 
. industry as a whole. Id. 
25. Ann Perry, Check the Fine Print on Credit-Card Offers, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIBUNE, July 16, 1995, at II. 
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the ceilings set by many states were too low to make consumer 
lending profitable.26 During this same period, banks were 
becoming increasingly active in the credit card market. Many 
banks saw tremendous business potential in this form of con-
sumer credit, but they were prevented from charging market 
interest rates due to state usury laws.27 
B. Deregulation of Interest Rates 
In 1978, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that would 
prove to have tremendous ramifications for the growth of the 
credit card business in the United States. In Marquette National 
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp. 
("Marquette"), the Court ruled that section 85 of the National 
Bank Act allowed a national bank to charge its credit card 
customers the highest interest rate permitted in the bank's home 
state, regardless of the interest rate limitations prevailing in the 
customer's state of residence.28 The Court was primarily con-
cerned with interpreting the language and history of section 85, 
but the solicitor general of Minnesota, attempting to prevent First 
Omaha from soliciting credit card customers in Minnesota at 
higher Nebraska interest rates, also contended that allowing the 
exportation of Nebraska's interest rates would make it very 
difficult for states to enact effective usury laws.29 Although the 
26. MANDELL, supra note 6, at 12. 
27. MANDELL, supra note 6, at 70-72,78-79. 
28. 439 U.S. 299, 307-19 (1978). Section 85 of the National Bank Act states in 
relevant part: 
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or 
discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidence of 
debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or 
District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess 
of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the 
Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is 
located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by 
the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under 
state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized 
or existing in any such State under this chapter [title 62 of the Revised 
Statutes]. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or 
District, the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not 
exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on 
ninety day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the 
Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the 
greater .... 
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). 
29. 439 U.S. at 318. 
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Court agreed that such might indeed be the case, it saw the usury 
issue as a legislative problem to be handled by Congress.3D Thus, 
after Marquette, a state with more restrictive usury laws could no 
longer protect its citizens from an interest rate charged by an out-
of-state bank that was higher than the state's legal maximum, so 
long as the rate was allowable in the bank's home state. 
In the wake of Marquette, states with no usury laws, or those 
with the highest legal maximums, became ideal locations for 
national banks to set up credit card operations. Indeed, shortly 
after the Marquette decision, several states repealed their usury 
restrictions or raised the maximum interest rate that could be 
charged on a consumer loan.31 Major issuers, such as Citibank 
and Maryland Bank, N.A., moved their credit card operations to 
escape the usury laws in their home states, often using the threat 
of lost jobs to pressure their home state legislators into liberaliz-
ing the usury statutes.32 The credit cards were marketed 
nationally from the new locations, and the usury limits of the 
customers' states of residence became irrelevant. The Marquette 
decision thus had the net effect of deregulating interest rates in 
the credit card market. 
In the early 1980s, high credit card interest rates were in 
step with the interest rates that were then prevalent in the 
economy for all kinds of loans. But this period was anomalous. 
By the mid-1980s, interest rates began to drop. Credit card 
interest rates, however, remained steady. From 1972 to 1992, the 
average interest rate on credit cards in the United States 
30. 439 U.S. at 319. 
31. Marquette essentially ushered in an era of interest rate competition among 
the states, and individual states could no longer effectively govern the credit card 
transactions of their residents. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence 
and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking 
Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 685·86 (1987). 
32. In the years following Marquette, many major banks used the threat of lost 
jobs to pressure states into relaxing or ending interest rate regulation. These were 
not idle threats. When the Maryland legislature capped interest rates at a level that 
the Maryland National Bank, one of the largest card issuers in the country, thought 
was too low for its credit card operations, those operations, and the credit card 
operations of several other major Maryland banks, moved to Delaware. Alison 
Muscatine, Fourth Maryland Bank Plans Credit Card Operations Move, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 26, 1982, at Bl. Delaware set no limit on interest rates and permitted banks 
to charge additional fees on credit cards that were forbidden in Maryland and many 
other states, which attracted credit card operations from around the country. 2 Mich. 
Banks Hint Delaware Move, While Maryland National Does It, AMERICAN BANKER, 
Mar. 4, 1982, at 2. 
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remained between 17% and 19%.33 During the same time period, 
the average rates on most other types of loans, including con-
sumer loans, fluctuated over a range of at least eight percentage 
points and dropped steadily from a peak in 1981.34 By 1992, the 
prime rate had dropped to six percent, where it remained through 
1993, making the average credit card interest rate eleven to 
thirteen percentage points higher than the prime lending rate.35 
1. Mter Deregulation: Legislative Responses to High 
Credit Card Interest Rates 
High rates for credit card borrowing have not gone unnoticed. 
During 1987, when the prime rate dropped below nine percent, 
Congress considered a federal cap for credit card interest rates.36 
Although the legislative activity did not produce an interest rate 
ceiling, it did result in legislation that mandated better disclosure 
by credit card issuers of important information on the terms of 
credit card plans.37 More recently, a brief but rather intense 
battle was fought on Capitol Hill over the issue of credit card 
interest rates. In November of 1991, President Bush, facing an 
election and an economy in decline, mentioned off-handedly that 
33. Credit Card Study, supra note 11, at 652. 
34. Id. It is interesting to note that even when these rates were at their highest, 
they were still lower than the average rate for credit cards. Id. 
35. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE, MONTHLY INTEREST RATES: JANUARY 1, 1970 TO DECEMBER 31, 
1993. Average credit card rates declined to 16.8% in 1993. GAO REPORT, supra note 
4, at 13. The difference between the average credit card rate and the cost of funds 
was nevertheless 11.50%, the highest level since 1976. Id. at 14. 
36. In 1988, Congress passed the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act 
of 1988, which preempted state statutes and mandated disclosure of various 
information on credit card interest rates, fees, and conditions. Fair Credit and 
Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1994). In the House version, 
the bill also contained an amendment that would have capped credit card interest 
rates by floating those rates at 8% above the yield of one-year Treasury securities. 
Although the disclosure bill passed almost unanimously in the House (there was one 
dissenting vote), the amendment was defeated 356 to 56. Nancy L. Ross, House 
Passes Credit Card Disclosure Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1987, at E2. 
37. In passing this legislation, Congress chose a "disclosure approach" to deal 
with the problem of high credit card interest rates. Accepting the assumptions of 
free-market economic theory, Congress hoped to promote a more competitive credit 
card market by increasing the amount of information on revolving credit available to 
consumers. It was hoped that consumers would comparison shop and that this 
process would force card issuers to offer better deals. For a more complete review of 
the congressional discussions surrounding the legislation, see S. REP. No. 259, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936-3962. 
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perhaps credit card interest rates were too high and that this 
situation was not helping consumer spending.38 Congress 
immediately seized the issue. Within days, the Senate had voted 
in favor of a federally mandated cap on credit card interest rates, 
and it was assumed that the House would follow shortly thereaf-
ter.39 
On November 15, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plum-
meted 120 points, with some bank stocks losing as much as ten 
percent of their value. To protest the pending congressional 
action, banks threatened to cancel the credit cards of as many as 
half of the people who held them at that time.40 Soon President 
Bush retreated from his earlier statement, suggesting that rate 
caps were unwise. The Democratic leadership of the House 
announced that they agreed with the President, and the legisla-
tion died. Bank stocks rallied and continued to climb well into 
1992.41 
2. Accepting Deregulation: Justifications for the 
High Cost of Deregulated Credit 
These historical episodes suggest that even the nation's 
leaders have been uncomfortable with the consistently high credit 
card interest rates over the last decade and a half, particularly in 
the low interest rate economy of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
They have been unable, however, to resist the tremendous 
lobbying power of the banking industry and the appeal of 
economic arguments against interest rate regulation. During the 
1987 and 1991 debates over federal interest rate caps, as well as 
in the years since, credit card issuers have offered two primary 
reasons to explain the high cost of their credit. 
The first centers on the issue of cost. Card issuers contend 
that providing revolving credit through the vehicle of credit cards 
38. John R. Cranford, Cap for Credit Card Rates Catches Fire, 49 CONGo Q. 3364 
(1991). The President was relying on consumer spending to pull the nation out of a 
recession, despite the fact that, because of the recession, many consumers had lost 
their jobs or were underemployed. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. John R. Cranford, Credit Card Rate Cap: Flash in Pan, 49 CONGo Q. 3442 
(1991); Albert B. Crenshaw & Kara Swisher, Bank Industry Says Rate Cap Would 
Cost Many Their Credit Cards, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1991, at Dl. 
41. Crenshaw & Swisher, supra note 40, at Dl; See James J. Cramer, Card 
Sharks, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 26, 1992, at 19. 
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is expensive. When banks initially began issuing· credit cards in 
large numbers there were high start-up costs, relatively low 
receivables, and state usury ceilings that prevented an upward 
adjustment of interest rates.42 Once usury restrictions were 
removed or minimized, banks still had to contend with the higher 
operating costs and higher default risks per dollar of receivables 
in the credit card business than in other types of bank lending.43 
Because most credit cards are unsecured, the risks of default are 
generally higher than is typical for other bank loans. The charge-
off rate for credit card operations (that is, losses sustained due to 
uncollectible accounts) is substantially higher than that for other 
types of bank lending, and the costs associated with processing a 
large number of relatively small transactions are considerable.44 
The high level of additional expenses means that the cost of funds 
comprises a smaller portion of the cost of credit card operations. 
For credit card lending, then, there must be larger differences 
between interest rate indicators in the market (such as the prime 
rate) and credit card interest rates.45 I will refer to this as the 
"cost argument." 
The second argument is inspired by liberal economic theory 
and is rooted in ideas about individual choice and the operation 
of the free market. If they so choose, card issuers note, consum-
ers always have the option of securing credit through less 
expensive vehicles. In the last few years, partly in response to 
the attempt to control card rates in 1991, more card issuers have 
offered adjustable-rate cards and lower-rate cards tied to the 
prime rate or other major interest rate indices.46 Card issuers 
argue that any cap on interest rates would simply limit the credit 
options available to consumers as a group. As is the case with the 
lower-interest cards being marketed today, lower rates would be 
given only to customers who were perceived. by the issuers as 
lower risk. Card issuers would offer fewer products and consum-
ers applying for cards would have to be more creditworthy. Many 
42. Through most of the 1970s and early 1980s, credit card operations were the 
least profitable of all bank operations. MANDELL, supra note 6, at 78. 
43. GAO Report, supra note 4, at 24; Arthur P. Hall & J. Marc Wheat, Do Credit 
Cards Need Interest Rate Caps?, CONSUMERS'RES., Feb. 1992, at 30·31. 
44. Credit Card Study, supra note 11, at 658. 
45. Id. at 660. The cost of funds generally comprises 25% to 50% of the cost of 
credit card operations. Id. See also Hillary Rule, Credit Card Interest Rates and 
Their Immunity to Market Fluctuations, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 463, 472·73 (1988). 
46. See discussion supra note 21. 
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consumers, particularly the more marginal ones, would be shut 
out of the credit card market and, in the final analysis, would 
neither appreciate, nor benefit from, the government's paternalis-
tic "consumer protection" of interest rate caps.47 Consumers 
would benefit not from protectionist laws that stifle economic 
growth and limit individual choice, but rather from better 
information with which to educate themselves about available 
credit options. Such information would enable them to make 
rational credit decisions based on their particular needs.48 
illtimately, this second contention, which I will call the "free-
market argument," is the most important. The argument 
essentially has two parts. The first part employs the language of 
liberal market economic theory by suggesting that the most 
efficient markets are those that most closely resemble "perfect 
competition" and are allowed to operate free from "artificial" 
restrictions, such as government regulation.49 Interest rate 
controls introduce a distortion into a market that would otherwise 
operate in a naturally competitive way. The second part of the 
argument draws on traditional American ideas about freedom 
and individualism to support the view that consumers should be 
able to go into the market and make bargains for credit as they 
see fit. The government should not interfere by imposing an 
47. In 1987, in a statement opposing any federal cap on credit card interest 
rates, Federal Reserve Board Governor Martha Seger said that the Federal Reserve 
opposed any attempts to cap interest rates because it "would likely reduce the 
amount of credit made available, forcing consumers to rely instead on less convenient 
and possibly more expensive substitutes, or to lose access to credit at any rate." Fed 
Opposes Legal Cap on Credit Card Interest Rates, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 1987, §4, at 
3. Seger added that this burden would fall most heavily on lower-income borrowers 
and perhaps would lead to increases in other credit card charges, such as annual fees 
and processing charges. Id. 
48. This information is essentially what consumers now receive after the 1988 
legislation. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
49. Markets in perfect competition have the following attributes: (1) numerous 
buyers and sellers; (2) a quantity of goods such that no single buyer or seller perceives 
that he or she can affect price by varying the quantity demanded or supplied; (3) 
product homogeneity; (4) accurate and complete product information for buyers and 
sellers; and (5) freedom of entry into and exit from the marketplace. SIDNEY SHAPIRO 
& JOSEPH TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAw AND POLICY 181 (1993). 
Under these strict conditions, a market attains its virtues by moving 
toward equilibrium, where the proper amount of goods are placed on the 
market at the proper prices. If anyone of these conditions is missing, the 
market is imperfect. In other words, a market failure exists, and 
government regulation may be needed to correct that failure. 
Id. Perfect competition is, however, an idealized version of the marketplace; no 
market is perfectly competitive. Id. at 189. 
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artificial limit on the types of deals that can be made, particularly 
when such a limitation would mean that certain people would be 
unable to make deals at all. Most arguments against regulation 
of credit card interest rates have been built upon these two 
themes-hence the contentions by opponents of interest rate 
controls that greater access to information would produce a more 
"rational" market, that consumers as a whole would be hurt if 
credit cards were more expensive and available to fewer people, 
and that "tighter" credit would have negative consequences for 
the country's economic well-being because it would make it more 
difficult for people to spend money. Opponents of credit card 
interest regulation employ this free-market argument liberally, 
and the presumptions underlying it are not often discussed. 50 
Regardless ofthe ultimate merits ofthe credit card industry's 
explanation for high credit card interest, an explanation that I 
will examine in more detail below, it is clear that despite high 
rates, the credit card business has expanded dramatically and 
card issuers continue aggressively to court, and win, new 
customers. 51 The business is extremely profitable and many 
customers are clearly willing to pay a substantial premium in 
order to have access to the bundle of services that credit cards 
50. A complete review of all of the circumstances in which this argument has 
been used would be impossible. It appears in most major debates on controlling 
credit card interest rates. Sources as important as the Federal Reserve have relied 
on it, see Fed Opposes Legal Cap on Credit Card Interest Rates (comments of Federal 
Reserve Governor Martha Seger), supra note 47, as have the New York Times and 
other major newspapers. In an editorial opposing federally mandated rate caps in 
1991, the Times stated that "[mJillions of cardholders would suffer, because banks 
and other issuers would cancel the cards ofless credit worthy customers. People with 
limited incomes would suffer most; they depend on the elbow room a credit card 
provides." The Senate's Credit Card Blunder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at A26. In 
addition, an editorial in the Los Angeles Times noted: 
The populist appeal of lower credit card rates is undeniable. But to 
legislate such a move now would be a disaster both for consumers and the 
already fragile banking industry. Capping rates now would force banks 
to scale back on issuing credit cards. That could make credit less 
available to hard-pressed consumers who sometimes use their cards to 
survive. 
Cut Credit Card Rates? Careful How You Do It; Offering Political Lollipops Won't 
Improve the Economy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at B6. 
51. In 1993, bank card issuers had their most profitable year since 1990, despite 
the introduction of some lower rate cards and increased competition from new 
entrants into the credit card market such as Ford and General Motors. Competition: 
The Credit Card Industry Rides a Wave of Profitability, supra note 17. Credit card 
profits continued to rise in 1994, with Visa and MasterCard issuers earning after-tax 
profits of $4.7 billion, up 4.4% from 1993. Id. Profit margins declined slightly from 
a 2.3% after tax return on assets in 1993 to a 2.1 % return in 1994. Id. 
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provide. Why should the law intervene when the market has 
established a price for a service that consumers want and that 
credit card issuers are eager to offer? 
II. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING REGULATION 
OF CREDIT CARD INTEREST RATES 
A. The Economic Argument Against Regulation 
From an economic perspective, interest is the cost to a 
borrower for the use of money over a specified period of time. The 
actual interest rate charged will reflect several factors, including 
(1) the relationship between the supply and demand for credit in 
the relevant market, (2) the element of uncertainty of repayment, 
or risk of default, which will vary with the type of loan and 
borrower, and (3) the perceived cost of "riskless" credit.52 These 
factors together will create a "market" rate of interest. When a 
usury ceiling exists, market forces will determine the cost of 
credit as long as the market rate does not exceed the legal rate. 
If, however, the market rate is higher than the legal rate, lenders 
have no economic incentive to lend because the legal rate 
produces insufficient profit relative to the costs and risks of 
making loans. Lenders will decline to make loans at the legal 
rate and will look instead for investments that will earn a market 
rate of return.53 Consequently, there will be less credit available 
in the market affected by the usury statute, thus inhibiting the 
ability of consumers to express their preferences for goods in the 
economy with money. The prices and terms of the credit that is 
available will often be more restrictive because lenders will 
compensate for their inability to charge a market interest rate by 
lending to consumers who offer lower risk and by increasing costs 
related to borrowing that are not considered under the law to be 
interest, such as down payments, processing fees, and collateral 
requirements. These changes in the market will tend to fall most 
heavily upon those consumers with lower incomes because they 
are generally perceived by lenders as posing a higher risk of 
default, wanting smaller loans (which are less profitable when 
costs are high), being unable to pay increased fees, and being less 
52. Note, Usury Legislation: Its Effects on the Economy and a Proposal for 
Reform, 33 V AND. L. REV. 199, 212 (1980). 
53. Id. at 212.13. 
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likely to have collateral. 54 Thus, from the perspective of liberal 
economic analysis, usury laws are counterproductive because they 
constrict the supply of credit in the economy and the ability of 
consumers of credit to make economic choices. Such laws hurt 
the poorer members of society because they are the least likely to 
get credit when usury law ceilings are below market rates. If one 
assumes that a major purpose of usury. laws is to protect lower 
income borrowers, then the economic analysis suggests that the 
laws harm exactly those people they are supposed to help.55 
Notwithstanding the impressive lobbying efforts of the credit 
card industry, congressional reluctance to impose caps stems from 
more than special-interest politics. It is also rooted in the very 
terms of the debate; in other words, in the construction of the 
arguments against interest rate regulation primarily in the 
language of liberal economics and individualism. The arguments 
in support of interest rate regulation, or usury laws, have a 
strong moral tone. These arguments are often seen as illegiti-
mate justifications for legal policy in a liberal democratic state.56 
Furthermore, how one manages credit card debt is an individual 
54. Id. at 214. But see George J. Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings 
Reexamined, 56 B.U. L. REV. 451 (1976). Wallace accepts this argument, but comes 
to a different conclusion about what it means. He contends that interest rate ceilings 
that have the effect of denying credit to high·risk borrowers may be justifiable on the 
grounds that they protect those consumers from a product that could be particularly 
dangerous to them. Id. at 458. 
55. The economic effects of interest rate controls on the credit card market 
during the early 1980s were analyzed by Christopher C. DeMuth in The Case Against 
Interest Rate Controls in the Credit Card Market, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1986). 
DeMuth argues that price controls in the form of usury laws in the credit card market 
generally leave consumers less well off by causing the supply of credit to grow more 
slowly or by creating undesirable changes in the terms and manner in which credit 
is provided. Id. at 221. He determines that a national rate ceiling for credit cards 
would decrease the availability of credit cards for those who are considered higher 
credit risks and would increase forms of credit that were unregulated, more costly, 
or both. Id. at 237·42. 
56. Ronald Dworkin writes that liberalism takes as its constitutive morality the 
theory that political decisions must be independent of any particular view of what 
constitutes the "good life"; in other words, what gives value to life. Ronald Dworkin, 
LIBERALISM, excerpted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 63·65 (Michael Sandel ed., 
1984). See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). Rawls writes, "[p]olitical 
liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet 
incompatible comprehensive [religious, philosophical, and moral] doctrines is the 
normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free· 
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime." Id. at xvi. In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls reconsiders this foundational concept of liberalism, a concept that formed an 
important part of his seminal work on liberal theory, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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problem or choice. One may make unwise or even irresponsible 
decisions, but Congress is unwilling to prevent people from 
exercising their "right" to do SO.57 The concerns that inspired 
usury laws over centuries of human history may still be relevant 
to the discussion, but as moral ideas, they are too value-laden to 
compete with positions grounded in the culturally neutral, 
individually oriented "rights talk" of the opponents.58 
A more complete rationale for why federal interest rate 
controls have not been imposed on the credit card market 
emerges when one considers the interest-group theory of regula-
tion, which suggests that the creation of law and public policy 
results from the struggles of interest groups to redistribute 
wealth in their favor.59 Thus, "legislatures pass laws to benefit 
those groups that are able to pay for the laws with promised 
political support. The costs of these laws are borne by those who 
are in the worst position to object to them-the amorphous and 
disaggregated public."60 Deregulation of financial services 
reached its zenith during the period when the combination of high 
interest rates and restrictive usury laws were cutting deeply into 
the banking industry's profits. The removal of usury restrictions 
in the credit card market ushered in a new era of extraordinary 
profitability for consumer lending, which continues to this day. 
Legislative action to limit interest rates would cap the growth in 
profits. Credit card issuers have a strong incentive to lobby 
Congress to prevent the passage of any type of interest rate 
regulation. By casting the debate over controlling interest rates 
in terms of the individual's freedom to choose and by threatening 
to deny access to credit, they have been able to confound the 
57. Liberal economic theory is well suited to the American obsession with 
characterizing personal choices in terms of rights. For a discussion of the American 
fascination with individual rights and its effects on the discussion of social and 
political issues in the United States, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 
(1991). By stressing individual autonomy and personal freedom to choose, opponents 
of interest rate caps can often deflect attempts to "restrict" choices. Glendon notes 
that "[o]ur rights laden public discourse easily accommodates the economic, the 
immediate, and the personal dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the 
moral, the long· term, and the social implications." Id. at 171. 
58. See generally id. 
59. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982). 
60. Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of "Reregulation':' The Interest Group 
Dynamics of Regulatory Change in the Financial Services Industry, 45 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1275, 1278 (1988). 
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opposition. Any attempt to examine the broader ramifications of 
lack of interest rate controls in this market tends to devolve into 
an argument about freedom of choice and the benefits of the free 
market. Thus this transfer of wealth from American consumers 
to the credit card industry has been met by no effective congres-
sional response. 
The free-market argument has provided a strong defense 
against congressional attempts to regulate credit card interest 
rates at the national level. Credit, whatever its cost, is seen as 
beneficial, and it is more beneficial when it is available to the 
largest possible number of people. Certainly credit makes it 
easier for people to purchase all kinds of goods and services, and, 
as was discussed above, the American economy is quite dependent 
on consumer spending; as a result, encouraging consumption 
benefits the innumerable businesses that depend on consumer 
credit to remain profitable.61 No one wants to be responsible for 
taking away credit from the poor or other risky debtors and 
curtailing their ability to consume. Yet despite the widespread 
use and acceptance of the free-market argument, it has not gone 
unchallenged. 
B. Problems with the Economic Argument Against 
Regulation 
In The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market,62 
Lawrence Ausubel takes issue with some of the basic assumptions 
that are essential to the economic foundation of the free-market 
argument. Ausubel asserts that, despite the large number of 
participants and the lack of significant regulatory controls, the 
assumption that the credit card market in the 1980s would reflect 
a competitive market model is empirically unjustified. To support 
this contention, he finds that consumer behavior in the credit 
card market is economically irrational and that consumers are 
particularly insensitive to changes in interest rates.63 Further-
61. See, e.g~, Robin A. Morris, Co;tsumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for 
Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 169 (1988) (''Today, institutional pressures to increase 
consumer debt outweigh borrower incentive to refrain from indebtedness. Lenders, 
pushed by new competition from any business that has enough market power to raise 
and lend money, are under enormous pressure to sell credit and expand their portion 
of consumer debt in order to maintain profits.'), 
62. Ausubel, supra note 17. 
63. [d. at 71-72. 
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more, he determines that the rates of return for the credit card 
business are three to five times what is ordinarily seen in other 
areas of the banking industry.64 Irrational consumer behavior 
and "supranormal" profits do not suggest an industry operating 
in a model of intense competition.65 
Ausubel reviews the profit figures for the fifty largest credit 
card issuers in the United States and does a detailed analysis of 
the revenues and costs of one issuer that was fairly typical of the 
group, Maryland Bank, N.A. (''MBNA'').66 His analysis reveals 
that the single largest component of MBNA's revenue is finance 
charges and that, despite a twenty-five day grace period on 
outstanding balances, fully eighty percent ofMBNA's credit card 
accounts incurred such charges.67 In 1987, MBNA's after tax 
return on assets in its credit card division was 2.78 % (4.8 % 
before taxes), which compared to a return after taxes of one 
percent for the holding company as a whole.68 Ausubel concludes, 
after examining the returns of several other major card issuers, 
that credit cards generally earn three to five times the ordinary 
64. Id. at 63-64. 
65. "Supranormal" is Ausubel's description of the credit card profits he 
documented during his study period. Id. at 50. Rather than suggesting that firms 
are competing in a market approaching perfect competition, which has been the 
argument of credit card issuers and opponents of interest rate regulation, high profits 
and the entrance of many new suppliers of a product into a market tend to indicate 
the existence of a market in monopolistic competition. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 124·25 (4th ed. 1992). When prices exceed competitive 
levels in an industry, producers can lower prices or they can engage in nonprice 
competition by offering better service, higher quality, or incentives to use the product. 
Id. at 278·79. See also MANDELL, supra note 6, at 80-81. In the most recent 
comprehensive government report on the credit card industry, the General 
Accounting Office was unwilling to confirm or reject the contention that the credit 
card market functions in an anticompetitive manner. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 
24. 
66. MBNA was the thirty-ninth largest U. S. bank holding company at the time 
of Ausubel's study and the seventh largest issuer of MasterCard and VISA cards. 
Ausubel, supra note 17, at 52. Ausubel notes that MBNA was founded in 1982 in 
Newark, Delaware, "apparently to avoid Maryland's usury law." Id. at 57 n.18. In 
1993, MBNA was the fourth largest issuer of credit cards in the nation. Top 50 
Companies in Bank Credit Card Lending, THE AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 20, 1993, at 
20. 
67. Ausubel, supra note 17, at 58. Ausubel notes in a footnote on the same page 
that a good rule of thumb mentioned in credit card trade publications is that 90% of 
a card issuer's outstanding balances will incur interest charges. Id. at 58 n.20. 
68. Id. at 59. MBNA's return on assets in 1987 was very close to the industry 
averages for 1992 and 1993, which were 2.0% and 2.3% respectively. Competition: 
The Card Industry Rides a Wave of Profitability, supra note 17. 
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rate of return in the banking industry.69 Thus, the returns in this 
business appear to justify whatever costs that must be incurred. 
Ausubel correctly predicted that high profits would be maintained 
in the years 1990-93.70 
Ausubel also finds substantial variance with competitive-
market theory when he examines the behavior of credit card 
consumers. The percentage of accounts incurring interest charges 
is substantially higher than the percentage of consumers who say 
they carry balances, and Ausubel surmises that most consumers 
are unwilling to admit, or are even unaware of, how often they 
borrow money by using credit cards.71 Furthermore, consumers 
are much more sensitive to increases in annual fees than they are 
to increases in interest rates.72 He sees consumer behavior in the 
credit card market as irrational and states that the "proclivity of 
consumers to borrow at these high rates suggests a substantial 
breakdown in optimizing behavior among credit card holders.'>73 
Ausubel does not suggest that his findings lead to the conclusion 
that credit card interest rates should be capped. He argues, 
however, that it is flawed reasoning from a regulatory standpoint 
to support the present laissez-faire interest rate regime in the 
credit card market by using arguments drawn from a model of 
perfect competition.74 Neither the behavior of consumers, nor the 
69. Ausubel, supra note 17, at 63-64. Ausubel determines that the ordinary 
(pretax) return on equity in banking was around 20% during the period 1983-88 and 
that credit cards earned returns of 60% to 100% during the same period. Id. 
70. See Banking Industry Reaps Credit Card Profits, supra note 17. 
71. Ausubel, supra note 17, at 71-72. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 74. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that more economists are 
recognizing the substantial flaws contained in models of "economic rationality." On 
attempts by economists to encompass a more realistic view of the way people think 
in economic models, see Rational ECOlwmic Man: The Human Factor, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1994, at 90. 
Professor Ausubel recently completed a follow-up study on the credit card 
market. Lawrence Ausubel, The Credit Card Market: Revisited (July 20, 1995) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Law Review). Mter 
reviewing a wider sample of market data from the credit card market from 1971 
through 1993, Ausubel was able to confirm his earlier finding that the credit card 
market does not conform to a market model of perfect competition. Id. at 2. He 
reports that although interest rate "stickiness" has declined during the 1990s, the 
return on assets for credit cards from 1983 to 1993 has averaged five times the return 
on assets for the entire banking system. Id. Additionally, Ausubel extends the 
empirical investigation of the phenomenon of consumer underestimation of the 
amount borrowed on credit cards and finds that consumers underestimate or 
underreport their credit card balances by a factor of two. Id. at 3. Indeed, Ausubel 
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behavior of suppliers of credit, indicates the existence of a 
competitive or rational market. 
Ausubel's arguments cast doubt on the ability offree-market 
economic theory to provide an adequate justification for a legal 
policy that rejects interest rate controls in the credit card market 
based in large part on putative benefits to consumers due to the 
increased availability of credit in an "unregulated" market. When 
profits are examined, card issuers are certainly major beneficia-
ries of the current policy, and this fact no doubt accounts for its 
endurance. What one can conclude from the economic analyses, 
and from the statistical information available, is that an unregu-
lated interest rate regime in the credit card market will have 
several important results. First, there will be a large supply of 
credit available to a broad spectrum, in socioeconomic terms, of 
the population. Second, this credit will be extremely expensive 
relative to other modes of borrowing. Third, the overwhelming 
majority of people who have access to this credit will borrow, 
despite the high cost. Fourth, the cost to card issuers of providing 
credit cards will be money well spent given the return on the 
investment. Money directed into credit card operations will reap 
a larger return than it would if directed into other types of 
lending. The cost argument should thus be rejected as a satisfac-
tory explanation for high credit card interest rates. 
Considering traditional free-market economic reasoning 
when selecting a legal rule, particularly when the subject is 
interest rate regulation, is an important part of determining 
whether the rule is sound. But it is only a part of such a determi-
nation. Without a broader inquiry, this consideration alone may 
lead to the acceptance of rules that, while perhaps appropriate in 
the theoretical marketplace, create disturbing problems in the 
real world.75 Banks and other businesses do not issue credit cards 
notes that this "underestimation hypothesis" was seen as "the key provocative and 
ideological issue" of his work by some readers and, although he is somewhat 
uncomfortable with a behavior theory that varies so widely from that which is 
generally assumed by economists, he admits that it "does genuinely appear to ring 
true." [d. at 1. 
75. Professor Kripke has expressed concern about the increasing reliance on 
abstract economic theories and secondary sources to gain an understanding of the 
business world; he advocates, instead, greater use of "realistic observation" of what 
actually happens. Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic 
Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 932-33 
(1985). 
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hoping that people will immediately pay their debts. The 
"convenience user" who never incurs an interest rate charge is the 
bane of the credit card issuer's existence.76 Credit card issuers 
must assume that most consumers will go into debt when they 
have credit cards in their pockets and that these debts will be 
paid off over time.77 They depend on this to make high profits. 
From a social policy perspective, it does not seem particularly 
remarkable that many people behave irrationally when they have 
access to the "easy money" that credit cards provide. There has 
probably been no other time in American history when such a 
large cross section of the population has had access to so much 
money and at the same time had almost unlimited spending 
opportunities. 
Are we better off as a social community when our impulse to 
spend money that we do not have is constantly encouraged? By 
allowing us to consume fairly painlessly, credit cards mask the 
hard, cold reality that most of us cannot afford all of the things 
we want, and many of us cannot afford all of the things we need. 
This is the broad issue with which the law must be concerned, 
and to analyze it exclusively in the language of liberal economic 
market theory is inappropriate. By limiting the discussion to the 
language of the market we have limited our understanding of 
human nature and the role of the law to the acquisitive and 
rational values of the commercial economy, despite the fact that 
76. If a card has a grace period, the convenience user gets an interest free loan 
from the time the purchase is made until the time that payment is due. The credit 
card industry has begun to discuss ways to make convenience users pay for the 
"privilege" of having a credit card, such as charging transaction fees, shortening grace 
periods, and tying perks such as low interest rates and rebates to the amount of debt 
a customer carries. Glenn Burkins, Banks Target Paid·Up Cards: "Convenience 
Users" Eat Into Profits, ARIZ. REPUBUC, June 28, 1993, at E3. 
77. Since 1980, the delinquency rate (more than thirty days past due) for bank 
card loans has generally averaged between 2% and 3%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra 
note 3, at 522. Thus, in a bad year, 97% of the accounts are current. Professor 
Warren has noted: 
Banks have rising losses in consumer bankruptcy, but what have they 
done every single year? They have put out as many more cards as they 
could. Why? Because it is profitable to take those credit card losses. That 
is what the statistics show them: go ahead, because although one out of 
a hundred debtors cannot pay, 99 are paying off at 21% interest. And 
when the spread between the wholesale and retail cost of money is from 
6% to 21 %, business is profitable-even the highest risk business. 
Warren, supra note 4, at 1108. 
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our communal, real-world experience tells us that economic 
exchange is not always the driving force behind our choices.78 
III. CONSTRUCTING A RICHER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF 
INTEREST RATE CONTROLS IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET 
A. Coming to Terms with the Concept of Usury 
It is impossible to evaluate the current lack of interest rate 
controls in the credit card market without placing the issue in the 
context of the long-standing debate surrounding usury laws. 
There are few forms of economic regulation that have a more 
ancient lineage than the laws against usury. In the Western legal 
tradition,79 laws prohibiting the lending of money for a profit 
were found among the Greeks and the Romans and were also part 
of ancient Jewish law.80 In the medieval Christian world, the 
taking of interest on money was seen as an affront to the univer-
sal brotherhood of man and was strongly condemned as 
immora1.81 Traditionally, prohibitions against usury in the 
Western tradition were grounded in the Aristotelian idea, later 
promoted by Christian thinkers, that the purpose of money was 
exchange. It could be traded for another good, but its basic 
nature was sterile, and it could not reproduce itself. In other 
78. I am borrowing a theme here from James Boyd White, which he discussed 
in his essay, Economics and the Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161, 
194-96 (1987). 
79. For the purposes of this article, the ''Western legal tradition" encompasses 
those legal systems that draw their primary inspiration from Greek, Roman, and 
Hebrew texts and the experience of Christianity. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAw AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 1-10 (1983). 
Although there are different ways of specifying the systems. there is general 
agreement that this would include the Anglo-American and Romano-Germanic legal 
systems that predominate in North and South America, the British Isles, and the 
European continent. Id. 
80. In ancient law, usury was generally defined as the taking of any profit upon 
a loan of money. Aristotle wrote in condemnation of usury. ARISTOTLE, THE 
POLITICS, Book 1, Ch. 10 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984). See also ODD LANGHOLM, THE 
ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF USURY (1984). The Romans limited the taking of interest 
in the Law of the Twelve Tables (449 B.C.). JEAN-PHILIPPE LEVY, THE ECONOMIC LIFE 
OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 55 (1967). The Jews were forbidden by Moses to practice 
usury among themselves. Leviticus 25:35-37. 
81. Both Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas condemned usury as sinful, 
evil, and contrary to ideas of Christian brotherhood espoused in the Gospels. 
BENJAMIN NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY: FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVERSAL 
OTHERHOOD 13-14 (1969). 
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words, it was contrary to the ways of nature for money to produce 
more money.82 Usury was thus an act contrary to the laws of 
nature and, eventually, God's law. As capitalism grew in Europe, 
however, the prohibition against usury became more tempered. 
The abstract natural-law argument became increasingly difficult 
to square with Europe's growing commercial needs, and eventu-
ally ''usury'' came to be understood as the lending of money above 
the legal rate set by the sovereign.83 It is unlikely, however, that 
the natural law argument was the foundation upon which the 
prohibition against usury was built.84 
Societies have recognized throughout recorded history that 
people burdened with excessive debt are prime candidates for 
exploitation; civil and religious leaders in all parts of the world 
have assumed that laws regulating the taking of interest were 
necessary. Most usury prohibitions are grounded in deep ethical 
and religious condemnations of the exploitation of the weak, of 
socially destabilizing concentrations of wealth, and of the 
accumulation of money or wealth without an investment of 
labor.85 John Noonan argues that "the vitality and relevance of 
82. In Aristotle's view: 
[U]sury is most reasonably hated, because one's possessions derive from 
money itself and not from that for which it was supplied. For it came into 
being for the sake of exchange, but interest actually creates more of it .... 
[I]nterest is money born of money. So of the sorts of business this is the 
most contrary to nature. 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 80, at 49-50. See also John T. Noonan, Jr., Tokos and Atokion: 
An Examination of Natural Law Reasoning Against Usury and Against 
Contraception, 10 NAT. L. F. 215, 16-219 (1968). 
83. The Protestant countries were the first to break with the traditional 
prohibitions against usury in Europe, and John Calvin was the first major religious 
leader to legitimate, from a Christian perspective, the taking of interest. NELSON, 
supra note 81, at 73-78. But Calvin saw important limitations: An excessive rate 
was always objectionable, it was sinful constantly to accept usury, and it was 
impermissible to take usury from the poor. Id. The general rule was that usury was 
permissible if it was not injurious. Id. This view eventually established itself in 
England and the American colonies. Id. at 95; Raymond B. McConlogue, Usury, 1 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 253, 255-56 (1928). 
84. Noonan, supra note 82, at 222. 
85. The traditional hostility to usury is found in societies around the world, 
including India, China, and all the Islamic countries. 2 FERNAND BRAUDEL, 
CMLIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH·18TH CENTURY: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 561 
(Sian Reynolds trans., Harper & Row 1982) (1979). The traditional Islamic view, still 
widely accepted by many Moslems today, rejects the taking of interest on three major 
grounds: 
(1) Interest or usury [excessive interest] reinforces the tendency for 
wealth to accumulate in the hands of the few, and thereby diminishes 
man's concern for his fellow man[;] 
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the [usury] rule are not to be identified with the supporting 
rationale of the nature of money. The rule protected certain 
values," Noonan notes, "not the rule itself and not the argument 
based on nature-which were to prove to be permanent parts of 
the Christian tradition."86 
In the Christian tradition, three major arguments were 
advanced in support of usury prohibitions-usury is uncharitable, 
it breeds the sin of avarice, and it has undesirable social conse-
quences.87 Simply put, usury was seen as a moral evil in society, 
and a rule of general application was needed to address its 
consequences. Noonan argues that it was the attempt to rational-
ize the rule through the "nature of money" argument that invited 
subsequent modifications of the usury prohibition in the Chris-
tian world.88 The endurance of usury laws through the centuries 
and throughout the world is an ongoing attempt by societies to 
grapple with specific moral issues in human and economic 
relations. 
In the United States, usury statutes traditionally have been 
the province of state law.89 Over the last twenty-five years, 
however, a majority of lawmakers have come to believe that laws 
limiting an individual's right to negotiate the terms of a loan are 
economically inefficient and unacceptably "paternalistic," As an 
example of this change, Congress has intervened on various 
occasions to override state usury laws; in addition, many state 
legislatures have had little difficulty liberalizing or abandoning 
(2) Islam does not allow gain from financial activity unless the beneficiary 
is also subject to the risk of potential loss; the legal guarantee of at least 
nominal interest would be viewed as guaranteed gain[; and] 
(3) Islam regards the accumulation of wealth through interest as selfish 
compared with accumulation through hard work and personal activity. 
Talib Siraaj Abdus·Shahid, Interest, Usury, and the Islamic Development Bank: 
Alternative, Non-Interest Financing, 16 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1095, 1102-03 (1984). 
Id. 
86. Noonan, supra note 82, at 222. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 225. 
It was a moral rule binding all men in the society because usury was a 
real evil in the society. The reality of that evil was expressed in an 
argument which now seems clumsy .... Its actual function was not to 
convince, but to symbolize .... But putting the case against usury on a 
rational level it invited all the subsequent changes. 
89. For a general discussion of the development of state usury laws in the 
United States, see James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of 
Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61. 
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 27 1996
1996] REDISCOVERING USURY 27 
their usury laws in order to promote the growth of credit markets 
and local financial-services businesses.9o 
B. Crafting a Broader Perspective on the Role of Interest 
Rate Controls in the Legal System 
By relying on the language of market economics, the oppo-
nents of interest rate controls for credit cards have been able to 
make their case in terms that are accepted increasingly in our 
social and political discourse as neutral. Opponents of interest 
rate controls are characterized as reasoned promoters of efficient 
markets and freedom of choice, whereas the proponents tend to 
be seen as moralizers or naive populists. The proponents' 
attempts to talk about questions such as issuer greed, excessive 
profits, and consumer weakness come across as hopelessly rooted 
in ''values'' and paternalism, and therefore undeserving of serious 
consideration in the public sphere.91 The idea that the market is 
one of the few institutions neutral enough to accommodate the 
varying needs and goals of a diverse society has become difficult 
to contest in American public life. 
James Boyd White wrote of the dangers of accepting the 
language of market economics as the rhetoric for our communal 
discourse on law and public policy. 
It is not too much to say, I think, that the modern celebra-
tion of the market as the central social institution-the most 
fair, the most respecting of autonomy, and the most effi-
cient-threatens to destroy the single greatest achievement of 
Western political culture: the discovery that a community can 
govern itself through a rule of law that attempts to create a 
fundamental moral and political equality among human 
beings.92 
90. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In 1980, Congress preempted 
state usury regulations as they applied to first mortgage loans on homes in Title V 
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1735f· 7a (1994). 
91. For an example of the hostility of liberal political theory to moral claims 
generated by religious tradition, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DrsBEUEF 
224·26 (1993). 
92. White, supra note 78, at 183. See also ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GoOD 
SOCIETY 82·110 (1991). 
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Liberal economics, White notes, assumes that individuals are 
rational economic actors, "without race, gender, age, or culture,"93 
who are motivated primarily by the desire to consume and 
acquire. Most economists do not suggest that this is a completely 
true representation of the way people always behave, only that it 
is a helpful simplification that serves as a reliable predictor of 
behavior, and that it is probably more reliable than any alterna-
tive hypothetical model. But White argues that as one becomes 
steeped in the language and the methods of liberal economics, it 
becomes impossible to remain objective as to the merits of this 
explanation of how the world works. Thus, most economists 
really do believe that the system tells the truth about the world.94 
This happens not only to economists, but also to noneconomists 
who speak the economic language. 
The language of economics takes terms such as "self-inter-
ested" and "rational" and applies them to human behavior in a 
technical, market-oriented sense. Any negative or unrealistic 
connotations the words have when applied to human behavior in 
their ordinary way are disregarded for the purpose of economic 
analysis. White contends: 
[O]ne cannot habitually think of human action in such 
terms-especially in a culture like our own, which is so heavily 
dominated by the motive of self-interest in the usual sense ... 
without in fact universalizing the ordinary rather than the 
technical meaning. The result is to validate both selfishness 
and the desire to acquire and consume.95 
The language of economics is offered to the law as the language 
on which legal analysis should proceed and to the public at large 
as a way to explain our communal life. Although the system 
claims to be value-neutral, it tends to make rational self-interest 
central and habituates the individual to thinking in those terms. 
Furthermore, the value neutrality that the system claims IS 
troubling in its own right, for it tends to remain silent on 
all questions of value that are external to the acquisitive and 
competitive ones enacted in the exchange game .... But this 
is to be silent on all the great questions of human life: ques-
93. White, Sllpra note 78, at 168. 
94. Id. at 169·70. 
95. Id. at 171. 
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tions of beauty and ugliness in art and music, sincerity and 
falsity in human relations, wisdom and folly in conduct and 
judgment, and the greatest of all questions, which is how we 
ought to lead our lives.96 
29 
In White's view, the language and culture of the law must be 
broad enough to encompass those "great questions," and it cannot 
be allowed to collapse into the economic mode of thought. In 
other words, the market must be subordinated to the values and 
practices of our larger culture.97 
As if justifying White's concerns, the public discussion of the 
issue of credit card interest rates indicates that the language of 
economics has become the language of law and public policy. 
Having asserted that a free market for credit is beneficial to 
society because more people will have access to credit (and thus 
will have access to the marketplace) and that interest rate 
controls are detrimental because they will take credit away from 
people (thus making market participation more difficult and 
denying them freedom of choice), the opponents of interest rate 
controls essentially rest their case. In a culture where the ability 
to consume and acquire is central to achieving happiness and 
satisfaction, such an argument might be sufficient. Although one 
could argue that this indeed describes the core of the American 
cultural experience, there is some hopeful evidence to the 
contrary. Our actions are not driven by market values alone. 
Certain cultural concerns have remained constant in society's 
struggle with the concept of usury laws, two of which are particu-
larly relevant to this discussion: (1) discouraging avarice and 
promoting charity, and (2) protecting the economically weak from 
exploitation by the economically powerful. 98 Despite the tendency 
96. Id. at 174. This is, in essence, a critique of Dworkin's central theory of the 
liberal state. See discussion supra note 56. 
97. White, supra note 78, at 197. White also notes that he is not opposed to the 
continuation of the market economy, but he favors it on the pragmatic ground that 
there is no better alternative. Its results are not "entitled to any special veneration 
or respect if they seem ... on independent grounds to be undesirable.'.' Id. at 197 
n.35. 
98. In their pastoral letters on Catholic social teaching, politics, and the U.S. 
economy, the U.s. Catholic bishops have spoken extensively on these topics, urging 
a more just distribution of wealth, equal human dignity of all persons in economic 
transactions, and respect for the dignity of work. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL (1986). Similar concerns are 
pervasive in Islamic thought as well. See discussion supra note 85. In the Jewish 
tradition, the right to acquire property and wealth has always been subordinate to 
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for these ideas to be overlooked in public discussions of interest 
rate regulation, they continue to resonate throughout American 
culture and are quite relevant to any discussion of the credit card 
market. 
1. The Problem of Greed 
Aristotle condemned the acquisition of wealth for wealth's 
sake as unnecessary and potentially unlimited.99 In the United 
States, there is a historical distrust of banks and the banking 
industry that can be traced to the earliest days of the republic. lOo 
This distrust is based in large part on the huge amounts of capital 
amassed by banking institutions and how those institutions have 
tended to exercise undue influence over the political and economic 
system. Today, this concern is often dismissed as so much 
populist nonsense, but the 1980s showed that the general public 
is wise to be suspicious. 101 The federal government, and conse-
quently the nation's taxpayers, have borne huge costs as a result 
of banking deregulation. 102 
concerns about the quality of human life. ALBERT VORSPAN & EUGENE J. LIPMAN, 
JUSTICE AND JUDAISM 186·87 (1956). 
99. ARISTOTLE, supra note 80, at Book 1, Ch. 9. 
100. The struggle between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton over the 
First Bank of the United States set the stage for two centuries of conflict over the role 
of large banks in American society. Hamilton saw a large central bank as essential 
to the young nation's developing commercial economy and feared the lack of strong 
central authority, while Jefferson saw concentrated power as inherently dangerous 
and favored a decentralized, agrarian society. See, e.g., BELLAH ET AL., supra note 92, 
at 68-70. 
101. A common way to dismiss concerns about accumulation of wealth in the 
banking industry is to call them "populist," which tends to conjure up images of 
unsophisticated farmers or flamboyant politicians from the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. See Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions 
Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 281 (1993) (''The heavy 
hand of nineteenth century populism continues to have a powerful effect on late 
twentieth century banking policy in the United States.'), Any notion current among 
the "people" concerning the dangers of concentrated wealth were vindicated when, 
after exacting all kinds of deregulatory concessions from Congress in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the banking and savings and loan industry dragged the nation 
through the worst financial crisis in fifty years. On the problems of the American 
bank regulatory system and how those problems might be repaired, see generally 
HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED (1991). 
102. The cost to the American taxpayers ofthe financial crises of the 1980s has 
been estimated at $157 billion over the next thirty-three years. Jeryl Bowers, 
Comment, The Resolution Trust Corporation's Override Regulation: Freedom For· 
Intrastate Branch Banking, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 691 (1992). 
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The recent history of the credit card industry· demonstrates 
yet another large transfer of wealth to the financial services 
industry, although this time it comes directly from consumers. 
Nonetheless, there is very little acceptable public language to 
discuss explicitly what many people believe implicitly-that 
credit card issuers have been taking advantage of consumers to 
a degree that is at best unseemly and at worst unconscionable. 103 
Such a belief suggests a value standard by which the conduct of 
credit card issuers can be judged and that, at a certain level or 
under certain conditions, there is a point where profits become 
excessive. The value assumption makes it difficult to express 
these ideas in a public forum and have them discussed in any 
serious way.104 When Senator Alphonse D'Amato introduced 
legislation to cap credit card rates in 1991, he stated that bank 
profits on credit cards were unreasonable and that card issuers 
were charging "usurious" rates. He contended that the large 
banks were gouging the middle-class borrower in order to prop up 
their sagging bottom lines. He also noted that during the mid-
1980s credit card issuers had assured Congress that letting the 
free market work would be the best way to bring credit card rates 
down, but as of 1991 rates were even higher-this despite a 
substantial drop in the cost of money. 
I would agree with the Wall Street Journal and with the 
economic [sic] professors who say: let the economy work, let the 
free marketplace work, ... and you will see interest rates come 
down .... [But] that is not the fact .... 
103. Ausubel states this idea in perhaps the most matter-of-fact way possible: 
"[H]igh interest rates may be essentially neutral from an efficiency point of view. 
However, they presumably have a strongly undesirable redistributive effect from the 
comparatively poor (consumers who borrow on credit cards) to the comparatively rich 
(owners of bank stock)." Ausubel, supra note 17, at 75. For views on the conduct of 
credit card issuers, see infra note 110. 
104. I do not assert that there are at present no value-based limits on market 
activity, but the circumstances under which those limits are reached tend to be rather 
extreme, such as the buying and selling of human beings. American democratic and 
economic liberalism increasingly seems to require a large measure of ethical 
neutrality. In 1976, George Wallace argued that "the model of the unregulated 
market seems to hold an almost magic fascination; unfortunately, the magic tends to 
bewitch rather than clarify. Although economic analysis helps identify a reform 
program's cost and benefits, it also tends to obscure the relevant ethical questions." 
Wallace, supra note 54, at 497. 
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... And sure, this may be a popular measure [the interest 
rate cap amendment], but you know that does not mean it is 
any less right to say that we should not permit usury, because 
that is exactly what this is. This is usury.105 
In his statements about the state of the credit card market, 
Senator D'Amato had tapped into strong feelings that have long 
anchored the idea of usury laws. He also pinpointed the tendency 
of Congress to rely on the "free-market argument" to a fault. But 
almost more interesting than the comments of Senator D'Amato 
is the violent reaction they produced. George Will, a highly 
respected member of the Washington press corps, attacked the 
Senator in a column that can only be described as vicious.106 Will 
stated that D'Amato "could not be trusted to run a lemonade 
stand, but says he knows just what bank profits are 'fair' and 
'comfortable,' what rates are 'reasonable,' 'adequate,' and 'appro-
priate,' and he knows banks are 'gouging' and 'ripping off credit 
card customers in ways that are 'shocking' and 'usurious."'lo7 Will 
went on to say that D'Amato was "raving" and that it took 
Senator Jake Garn to inject "fact" into the discussion. Garn had 
noted that high credit card rates subsidize the less creditworthy 
and are justified because credit cards do not have secured 
backing, have high default rates, and are costly to administer. lOS 
Senator Garn's comments are easily recognizable as the cost 
argument, which, as has been demonstrated above, becomes 
specious when placed in the context of credit card issuers' profits. 
Yet, in George Will's opinion, Senator Garn spoke the truth, while 
Senator D'Amato was raving. lo9 Regardless of one's opinion of 
Senator D'Amato or Mr. Will, does the issue of excessive profit-
taking not deserve to be discussed? Does one have to hold some 
special qualifications to question the business practices of an 
industry? Our broader cultural experience in the form of 
historical, religious, and ethical learning tells us that societies 
have long been occupied with these questions. Our nation's most 
105. CONGo REC. S16815-18 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. D'Amato 
concerning his amendment to the Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and 
Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.». 
106. George Will, Language as Noise: Senate's Credit Card Debacle, ATLANTA 
J. & CONST., Nov. 20, 1991, at All. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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important deliberative body seems to be an appropriate place to 
discuss them. 110 
2. Taking Advantage of Weakness 
Credit card issuers are well known for bombarding consum-
ers with direct mail solicitations offering credit cards. Certainly, 
it is up to the individual who receives the solicitation to accept or 
reject the offer, but in American society as it exists today the 
temptations that would lead one to accept a card and run up a 
balance immediately are quite intense. Americans are constantly 
presented with offers to buy things-in the mail, on the tele-
phone, in the street, on the television, on the radio. There is 
almost no sanctuary from incessant solicitations. Shopping is 
even regarded by a substantial portion of the American popula-
tion as entertainment.1ll We buy things constantly, replacing the 
not-yet-old with the soon-to-be-obsolete. Compared to Western 
Europeans, Americans spend more than three times as many 
hours shopping. 112 Our lives revolve around working and 
consuming, and some have argued that many Americans are 
110. In an editorial published shortly after the Senate approved a rate cap in 
1991, the New York Times dismissed the action as "populist folly." The Senate's 
Credit Card Blunder, supra note 50. On the other hand, letters to the editor of the 
Washington Post following the failure of the credit card interest rate cap legislation 
give some indication that Senator D'Amato, far from raving, was expressing 
sentiments that many people shared. Some ofthe letters read as follows: 
The banks say that consumers will be denied credit if a cap is placed 
on their rates. Well, okay. But who said that was a bad idea? 
Considering the amount of debt the average family has been forced into 
to maintain its standard of living, maybe it's a good idea to let the family 
pay some of its bills instead of encouraging it to go into debt. 
Letters to the Editor: Give Credit Where Credit is Due, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, 
at A20 (letter from Craig J. Gavin). 
Yes, money is getting cheap for the big spenders, but the only access 
average Americans have to credit is through their cards. Sure, the banks 
want the rate to remain high, because it is the one area of banking that 
is operating on a high profit margin. Once again, profit margins are 
reached on the backs of the middle class and the poor. It is obscene for 
the same financiers that brought us the S&L crisis and bank (ailures 
galore to have access to cheap money while the card-carrying public pays 
through the nose. 
Id. (letter from Daniel J. Donoghue). 
I strongly suspect that the banks, far from using profits from credit 
cards to balance unpaid credit cards, are using the profits to balance their 
own poorly performing loans. 
Id. (letter from Nancy M. MacKenzie). 
111. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 107. 
112. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 34 1996
34 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
locked in a vicious cycle of wanting more and more but never 
being truly satisfied.ll3 Because they allow people to shop 
without money and they make impulse buying easy and conve-
nient, credit cards have fueled this process. In constant dollars, 
however, real income has declined over the last twenty-five years, 
and ever-escalating material desires have outpaced people's 
abilities to satisfy them.1l4 Consequently, consumer debt has 
expanded dramatically.ll5 
In a country where economic activity is linked to the powerful 
cultural themes of individualism and freedom of choice, it is hard 
to argue that consumers are coerced into buying. Typically, 
consumers' credit problems are attributed to their own weakness, 
their lack of self-discipline, or their inability to manage their 
finances. When pressed by Congress or consumer advocates, 
credit card issuers suggest that better education on how to use 
credit will prevent problems related to its abuse.116 But when a 
television channel that offers twenty-four-hour shopping is 
broadcast to millions of people, most of whom have credit cards; 
113. Schor calls this consumerism and materialism "capitalism's squirrel cage." 
Id. at 117-22. Pope John Paul II has made similar observations about life in highly 
developed capitalist societies. Individuals buy and sell with the goal of replacing 
something they already have with something better, and they quickly find that the 
more they have, the more they want, but their deeper needs and aspirations remain 
unsatisfied. See Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [On Social Concern], 
Encyclycal Letter, Dec. 30, 1987. 
114. Since 1970, weekly earnings have declined in every private employment 
sector except services, where wages have remained constant, despite the 1980s boom 
in the service economy. See, e.g., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 457. Credit 
cards are no doubt helping many Americans maintain lifestyles they cannot afford. 
115. Credit card debt more than tripled from 1980 to 1991. Credit Card Study, 
supra note 11, at 656. More and more people find it difficult to maintain a "middle 
class lifestyle" on what they earn, which may explain the dramatic rise in debt among 
American consumers; some argue that this trend bodes ill for the nation's stability 
and preservation of its democratic institutions. See Jack Beatty, Who Speaks for the 
Middle Class?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May, 1994, at 65-78. 
116. See, e.g., Kiddie Credit Cards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Credit and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994) (statement of Gary J. Flood, Senior Vice President, 
Consumer Cards, MasterCard International) [hereinafter Hearings]. Noam Chomsky 
argues that this "education" is part of an information deluge designed to turn citizens 
into obedient "atoms of consumption," not savvy consumers. Noam Chomsky, 
Remarks at Loyola University's Conference on Manufacturing a New World Order: 
Containing the Crisis at Home and Abroad, Chicago (Oct. 18, 1994) (transcript on file 
with the University of Colorado Law Review). Consumers are supposed to remain 
"educated," despite being deluged with products and advertisements. On the 
alienation and cynicism that relentless consumerism has produced in American 
society, see generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN (1991). 
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when college students who have never been responsible for their 
own finances are simply given credit cards; and when credit cards 
flood the homes of people in all kinds of economic distress, there 
seems to be a concerted effort to encourage irresponsible financial 
behavior .117 
Credit cards make impulse buying easy and financially 
painless. The desire, or need, to make a particular purchase can 
be satisfied immediately, while payment can be postponed 
indefinitely. Most people have no difficulty rationalizing away 
any concerns about not being able to pay for a purchase at the 
time of sale by simply assuring themselves that they will have the 
money when the credit card bill comes due. Others simply accept 
the fact that they will pay for their purchase over time, regardless 
of the long-term cost. In either case, there is no need to be 
concerned about having money to make a purchase. 
The way credit cards are marketed to college and university 
students provides an interesting example of how credit card 
issuers profit from these predictable behavior patterns. In March 
of 1994, hearings were held on Capitol Hill by Congressman 
Joseph Kennedy to examine whether students needed to be 
protected from aggressive marketing practices by credit card 
companiesYs Ruth Susswein, Executive Director of Bankcard 
Holders of America, a national, nonprofit consumer group, 
testified that sixty-one percent of the nation's college students 
have at least one credit card and that cards are being marketed 
to high school seniors before they even get to college. ll9 Many 
students depend on the cards to pay their expenses, while others 
simply use them as spending money. Invariably, some of these 
students encounter serious financial difficulty. Lured by the low 
minimum payments, they quickly run up huge debts and only 
realize the seriousness of the problem when they can no longer 
117. Home shopping through television programs has become a growing 
industry throughout the country and many consumers find themselves charging large 
sums of money on credit cards to purchase goods advertised on ''home-shopping 
programs." Paul D. Colford, Shopping At Home With TV As Your Guide, NEWSDAY, 
Mar. 2, 1987, Part II, at 4. Consumer groups have warned that television retailers 
sometimes distort the quality of goods and use tactics that are designed to encourage 
impulse buying. David Rohde, If You Shop on Television, Use Caution, Experts 
Advise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 1994, at 8. 
118. Hearings, supra note 116. 
119. Id. at 4 (statement of Ruth Susswein, Executive Director, Bankcard 
Holders of America). 
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pay even the minimums. Most card issuers require no income, 
credit history, or cosigner before issuing cards to students: but 
when credit trouble arises, many parents pay the bills, lest their 
children be saddled with default judgments that would ruin their 
ability to obtain credit in the future. 120 
Large numbers of young people simply do not understand the 
concept of debt. Susswein cited a study by the Consumer 
Federation of America and American Express, which found that 
seventy percent of the college juniors and seniors interviewed did 
not know how one maintains or loses a grace period on a credit 
card and seventy-eight percent did not know the importance of 
the annual percentage rate (APR) as an indicator of the cost of a 
loan.121 
Card issuers responded that students need credit cards and 
that the vast majority of them use credit cards responsibly. They 
noted that college campuses are "active marketplaces" and that 
students have consumer demands similar to other segments of 
the population. Furthermore, college students, as adults, "have 
every right to have access to this payment option."122 Credit cards 
help initiate young adults into the practices of financial responsi-
120. Id. at 79. 
121. Id. Such ignorance has led to financial disaster for some of the students 
appearing before the committee. Although by no means representative of most 
students, their stories offer insight into the practices of some credit card issuers. The 
mother of one such student submitted the following to the Subcommittee: 
I am here today with my daughter Michele, because she is currently 
being sued by Signet Bank for $1,481.55, plus 23.8% interest and threats 
of attorneys fees for $370.39. I have tried, since 1992 to get Signet to stop 
this credit card interest accrual, and settle for 50% of the amount owed. 
I told the official who is in charge of marketing these cards to students ... 
that his bank if [sic] half wrong for marketing these cards to unwary 
students, and my daughter is half wrong for not understanding what she 
was getting into when she signed a contract for a long term, high interest 
loan. They sent me the two page micro type contract, and said she knew 
what she was signing .... 
I believe that it is unconscionable for these bank cards to take 
advantage of a college student's youth, and inexperience. They are 
ignoring their own sound banking practices by changing the rules to 
benefit themselves .... Banks can not state in their contract that falsely 
representing one's credit worthiness is a crime, and then turn around and 
give credit to one who is not credit worthy when it suits their own 
financial benefit .... 
Id. at 79 (statement of Connie Bedell). 
Connie Bedell also noted that she was told by a representative of Discover that 
the card companies are willing to take risks on college students without incomes 
because many parents, although they are not responsible for the debt, will payoff a 
child's card to protect the child's credit rating. Id. 
122. Id. at 54·55 (printed testimony of Visa U.S.A., Inc.). 
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bility. To assist in that process, MasterCard, Visa, and American 
Express have developed programs. and seminars to educate 
students on the importance of maintaining a strong credit history 
and the responsible use of credit.123 
It makes good business sense to give credit cards to students. 
Indeed, they are subjected to the same-if not greater-societal 
pressures to consume as is the rest of the population. More to the 
point, since most have fairly limited incomes, if they have any 
income at all, they are probably more likely to carry balances and 
pay interest. Being a "responsible" credit card customer simply 
means paying the minimum payment on time every month, which 
keeps the account current. Most students can do this and most 
will not want to damage their credit rating by defaulting, but that 
will not necessarily prevent them from spending irresponsibly.124 
Targeting college students is an effective way to assure that 
credit card use will become a part of the students' everyday lives 
once they enter the workforce.125 Consumer groups, parents, and 
members of Congress are reacting against this marketing 
strategy because it seems inherently manipulative. Youthful 
indiscretions can mean years of high-interest debt, or worse. 
Credit card issuers, however, have free rein to use whatever 
marketing practices they wish. College students represent just 
one aspect of the overall problem. As credit cards become 
universally accepted, the pressure increases for all consumers to 
have one, as does the willingness to take one at whatever terms 
are offered. The growing use of credit cards to purchase groceries 
123. See, e.g., 0,. at 6-7 (statement of Gary Flood, Senior Vice President, 
MasterCard International, Inc.). 
124. Students represent a huge market for all kinds of products, and there is 
little in the public discourse encouraging them to delay material gratification. In a 
culture that increasingly eschews restraint and self-denial, young people are thrust 
into the marketplace-unsupervised, naive, and with access to easy money. "The 
consumer society tolerates no deferred gratification between the gleam in the eye and 
the goods in the hand. It teaches terrible habits-to put off payment but never the 
acquisition." Marilyn Gardner, The Young and the Indebted, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 31, 1994, at 13. 
125. Card issuers want to start an early relationship with their consumers, and 
studies show that three out of four college students will keep their first credit card 
for ten to fifteen years. Hearings, supra note 116, at 54 (statement of Paul Allen). 
Some may be using that entire time to pay. for a college spending spree. At an 
interest rate of 16.5%, and assuming no new charges, it would take eight years and 
eight months to payoff a $1000 debt with a 2.5% minimum payment per month. The 
interest payments would total $766. Ed Avis, Buried in Debt,' Credit Card Offers 
Aren't Always a Special Delivery, Cm. '!'RIB., July 11, 1994, § 6, at 1. 
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presents particularly troubling questions. There will no doubt be 
large numbers of people who will go into debt at high rates of 
interest in order to keep food on the table. 
C. Rejecting the Free-Market Argument as an Adequate 
Justification for the Present Interest Rate Policy 
The empirical evidence makes it quite clear that profits in the 
credit card industry over the last ten years or more have been 
extraordinary compared to all other types of lending activity. At 
the same time, the credit card industry has come under attack 
because the way that industry's money is made-with high 
interest rates and by handing out credit cards to most any-
one-seems driven by greed and has been harmful to many 
people. Yet, despite widespread disapproval of those practices, 
the credit card industry has avoided effective interest rate 
regulation due to a general acceptance of the free-market 
argument against governmental intervention in these credit 
transactions. The free-market argument has drawn additional 
strength from the strong currents of respect for individual 
autonomy and freedom of choice that run through American 
culture. 
I have shown that by completely rejecting interest rate 
controls we have embraced and promoted those cultural 
traits-such as acquisitiveness and competitiveness-that 
encourage liberal spending, consumption, and the satisfaction of 
immediate individual desires. At the same time, we have ignored 
or deemphasized other cultural traits-such as charity towards 
those in positions of weakness, and disdain for greed and the 
concentration of wealth-that temper market activity and 
promote important cultural needs and communal values. Ideally, 
interest rate controls can be used to create a balance between 
these seemingly contradictory traits. The current credit card 
market is not balanced in this respect. Rather, in James Boyd 
White's terms, the market and its values have been allowed to set 
behavior standards for the society.126 Credit cards have moved 
from being a "luxury" or a "convenience" in a society of savers to 
a "right" or a "necessity" in a society of spenders. One would be 
justified in asking whether this change in attitude has really 
126. White, supra note 78, at 172-75. 
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helped consumers, as is often argued by the opponents of interest 
rate controls, or if it was simply skillful marketing by the credit 
card industry designed to increase profits.127 
Determining which cultural values should be promoted by the 
law in our liberal democratic state has become increasingly 
difficult. 128 As George Will asked during the 1991 debates on 
interest rate caps, by what authority can anyone in government 
determine that certain business practices are "greedy" or "usuri-
OUS?"129 In other words, how do we determine what greedy or 
usurious means? Our society and our legal system have more 
than enough historical and cultural information to give most 
Americans a reasonable idea of the meaning of those terms.130 
Meanwhile, credit card issuers continue to make handsome 
profits. It is clear that the card issuers benefit disproportionately 
from the current state of the law, but since promotion of the 
market has become central to our public discussion of this issue, 
as well as many others, any attempt to "interfere" with the 
market's "natural" workings is seen as unacceptable. l3l 
The premises underlying the free-market argument against 
interest rate controls are not neutral. A laissez-faire approach 
benefits aggressive issuers of credit cards who can flood the 
127. I have yet to see an answer to the question, "why must people have credit 
cards?" But for the fact that they have become ubiquitous in this country, there is no 
evidence that suggests a modern society needs this much unsecured credit to 
function. Promotion of consumerism has been a successful profit· making tool of 
American business interests since at least the 1920s, and Americans have been 
dissatisfied with their material comforts ever since. SCHOR, supra note 2, at 118·20. 
128. On the effect this phenomenon is having on our ability to govern ourselves, 
see JAMES D. HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR (1994). 
129. Will, supra note 106. 
130. As .noted above, condemnation of avarice, acquisitiveness, and 
manipulation of the weak by the strong has found support in Greco-Roman and 
Judeo-Christian thought, as expressed in the works of Aristotle, the Bible, and 
various Christian thinkers throughout European history. As part of the Western 
legal tradition, American law has long drawn on these sources for inspiration, and it 
is appropriate for it to continue to do so. See supra part III.A. 
131. Despite the fact that throughout human history unregulated markets have 
been quite exceptional, discussions of market regulation tend to proceed from the 
assumption, championed by free· market economists, that the unregulated market is 
the "natural" state of things. Edward L. Rubin, Deregulation, Reregulation, and the 
Myth of the Market, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1249, 1264-67 (1988). This is, however, 
a choice of one among many ways to view the world. "Very often, because the free-
market efficiency perspective is an appealing approach and is embedded in our 
cultural traditions, it will prevail. But it is simply a myth to transform these social 
choices into transcendent necessities." Id. at 1264. 
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market with their product. It also encourages debt, which card 
issuers depend upon to realize their profits. The importance of an 
unregulated interest market to credit card issuers is amply 
demonstrated by the tremendous lobbying power they have used 
to defeat interest rate caps. Yet, because the language of the free-
market argument is generally accepted as value-free, the 
unregulated market prevails, whereas attempts to control 
interest rates are viewed suspiciously as value-laden or "emo-
tional." 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET 
Human life is marked by fits of rational and irrational 
behavior. Our capacity for completely contradictory acts has 
shaped human history. From that history we have learned that 
the law can be used to encourage behavior both noble and vile. 
Cultures have developed and interpreted these historical experi-
ences and have attempted to promote actions that tend to bring 
a sense of order to life's chaos. Thus, the law can work in tandem 
with our larger cultural traditions and encourage that which is 
best in us, or it can be geared to the needs of the few and justified 
by appealing to our most selfish instincts. 
Credit cards are an important and useful payment device, 
and although most people who have them appreciate the conve-
nience, no one has a "right" to a credit card. There is always a 
great deal of temptation to use them in an irresponsible way. 
Many people find themselves in debt because they cannot resist 
temptation or perhaps because they are simply irresponsible. 
Others, however, are driven to use credit cards for all kinds of 
good reasons-for health care, emergencies, and basic necessities. 
Credit cards provide quick access to money whenever people 
think they need it, and people think they need money for both 
rational and irrational reasons. The law need not tell people 
when, how, and if they should incur debt, but it can control some 
of the consequences of indebtedness. At the very least, when 
interest rate controls are in place, the law does not countenance 
the taking of outrageous advantage, which comports with a 
cultural tradition stressing compassion for people in positions of 
weakness and rejecting the accumulation of wealth for wealth's 
sake. The credit card industry, however, is engaged only in the 
business of making money, and it thrives by taking advantage of 
weakness. This is not to say that the industry should not be free 
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to pursue profits. Individual consumers must have some measure 
of accountability for their actions if freedom is to have any real 
meaning in a democratic society. But it is equally appropriate for 
the state to control the profit-making impulse. 
What typically has been proposed to control interest rates in 
the credit card market is a floating cap on interest tied to one or 
more of the major money-market indices, such as the prime 
lending rate or the yield on Treasury securities. This has an 
attractive administrative simplicity because credit card issuers 
are already using these benchmark interest rates for many of 
their cards. Consumers are also increasingly familiar with 
floating rates through such vehicles as adjustable-rate mortgages. 
Furthermore, a floating cap on interest incorporates the economic 
reality of the ever-changing cost of money in the general economy. 
The most difficult part of the plan, however, would be setting the 
"spread" between the benchmark rate and the maximum credit 
card rate. Using the 1987 and 1991 congressional proposals for 
federally mandated caps on credit card interest rates produces 
some interesting results. 
The 1987 proposaP32 would have capped credit card rates at 
eight points above the rate for one-year Treasury securities.133 
Currently, the rate for these securities is approximately 6%, 
hence the current maximum allowable rate for credit cards under 
this proposal would be 14%. This is almost four percentage points 
lower than the average rate charged in 1994. The 1991 
proposall3-Would have capped credit card rates at four percentage 
points over the interest rate charged by the Internal Revenue 
Service for overdue tax payments.135 That rate is now 10% and 
thus would also produce a rate of 14%. Both proposals produce 
the same rate in 1995, a rate significantly higher than the cost of 
funds for bank borrowing, the yields on most treasury securities, 
and the prime lending rate.136 
Despite the difficulty in finding the most appropriate interest 
rate spread, a floating cap on interest rates is probably the best 
132. For a discussion of the 1987 proposal, see supra part LB.1 
133. See supra note 36. 
134. For a discussion of the 1991 proposal, see supra part LB.l. 
135. Cranford, supra note 38. 
136. In May of 1995, the federal funds rate was 6%, and the prime lending rate 
was 9%. Money Rates, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at C2l. The highest yield on 
Treasury issues was 7.22% for a 3D-year Treasury bond. 'Key Interest Rates, WALL ST. 
J., May 9,1995, at C17. 
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way to set a maximum rate. The easiest benchmark rate to use 
would be the prime lending rate, because this rate tends to set the 
standard for a great deal of consumer borrowing. After an initial 
credit application, many banks offer their customers unsecured 
lines of credit through checking accounts at two to three percent-
age points above the prime lending rate. Not everyone who would 
qualify for a high interest rate credit card would qualify for a line 
of credit, but by doubling the interest rate spread for credit card 
interest rates, to six points over prime, credit cards should remain 
a viable profit-making device for card issuers and available to a 
large number of consumers. Currently, a six percentage point 
spread over the prime lending rate would produce a credit card 
interest rate cap of 15%, which falls in the same range as the 
1987 and 1991 proposals. 
A top rate of 15% is, of course, much lower than the current 
average rate. l37 Card issuers would undoubtedly argue that many 
people will no longer qualify for credit cards. One might question, 
however, whether it is good business to take credit cards away 
from people who are currently paying off balances at high interest 
rates simply because the rate must be lowered. It would be better 
to have a customer paying a lower interest rate as opposed to 
having no customer at all. l3B To minimize disruption in the 
current market, the cap could be phased in over time and credit 
extended before the cap could be paid off under the original 
terms. l39 
Interest rate controls in the credit card market would have 
two major, immediate benefits. First, they would establish some 
137. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
138. Under the current law, with no interest rate restrictions, the number of 
people who are delinquent is tiny compared to the number of people who keep their 
accounts current. Typically, 97% of the people who have credit cards have proven 
they are good credit risks, so it is good business to lend them money. See STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 522. It would be foolish to drop a steadily paying 
customer because you cannot charge a higher interest rate. Some profit is better than 
none at all. Thus, as long as a card issuer can make a profit, common sense would 
indicate that the number of people who would lose access to credit cards should not 
be large. 
139. As a result of the legal and economic policies of the past few decades, I 
accept a certain amount of consumer dependence on credit cards as a fact. Given the 
threats the industry made in 1991, see supra note 40, and the realities of interest 
group politics, consumers would probably be hurt the most in the short term if card 
issuers revoked a large number of credit cards. A rate cap phased in over time would 
allow consumers and card issuers to adapt to the changes in a more organized and 
thoughtful way. 
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card issuer discipline in a market that distributes credit like so 
much free candy. Credit card issuers would be forced to screen 
marginal customers more carefully and would probably be less 
willing to raise credit limits. More card issuers might be encour-
aged to use traditional lending standards when issuing credit. 
Perhaps more issuers would require cosigners or security 
payments on cards for college students and people with poor 
credit ratings. Consumers might have less access to credit, but 
that is not necessarily a negative development. Less unsecured 
consumer credit in the economy may have socially beneficial 
effects, such as promoting savings, lowering indebtedness, 
discouraging impulse buying, and encouraging more community-
based and mutual-aid type lending. 140 In sum, the negative side 
effects of interest rate controls from the perspective of liberal 
economic theory can be seen as benefits when viewed from a 
larger cultural and social perspective. 
Imposing interest rate controls situates consumer-credit law 
within the context of a balanced set of societal values. The 
present market approach projects the message that having the 
broadest possible market for credit cards is more important than 
the terms on which that credit is provided. It suggests that the 
law's primary purpose is to encourage spending and profit-
making on whatever terms the market determines are valid. It 
also promotes a view of individual consumers and suppliers of 
credit as autonomous actors in the credit market, without any 
connection to larger community values and standards governing 
the terms of their bargains or the value to society of their 
activities. 141 Currently, those who do not strike the best possible 
deals and those who pay too much or overextend themselves are 
140. For an argument on the macroeconomic benefits of usury laws, see 
generally Morris, supra note 61. In a recent article criticizing the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which is designed primarily to encourage banks to extend credit 
to distressed urban communities, Professors Macey and Miller suggest that residents 
of these areas could meet some of their credit needs by organizing private lending 
clubs, which are common in many Asian-American communities, rather than relying 
on commercial lending institutions. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 344-46 
(1993). Perhaps such self-reliance should be encouraged throughout the society. 
141. The Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, supra note 36, 
does mandate that credit card companies provide information on interest rates, 
payment terms, etc., but increasing the amount of information available in an era of 
information overload may simply cause consumers to despair of ever obtaining 
enough information to make truly educated decisions. 
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considered poor market actors, irrational, or just plain 
dumb-they deserve what they get. 142 Those who navigate the 
system successfully have a "right" to whatever benefits come their 
way. Historically, however, the message of the law and the larger 
culture has not been so harsh. Both have recognized that 
although no one wants to be overtaken by debt, for a variety of 
reasons, people do things that are against their best interests. 
The law can at least attempt to prevent exploitation. 143 
The most significant challenge to the idea of interest rate 
controls would be that it is inappropriate for the law to take a 
moralistic posture that restricts the freedom of individuals to 
make their own economic bargains and that limits freedom in 
order for the state to promote certain moral or cultural ideas 
about how people ought to behave. This challenge assumes, 
however, that by taking a laissez-faire approach to interest rate 
regulation, the state is remaining neutral on the question of 
142. In preparing this article, I was struck by how dismissive many people were 
about the problems individuals might have because of credit cards. There seemed to 
be an assumption among many that anyone who paid high credit card interest rates 
was foolish or irresponsible, that they did not "shop around for the best deal," or that 
they did not know how to manage their money. Some thought the poor or lower 
income might deserve protection, but "other people should know better." There is 
little compassion for people who show weakness in the marketplace, as if one's ability 
in that arena is indicative of one's worth as a person. No wonder people lie about 
carrying balances on their credit cards! Rather than wonder what it is about our 
communal life that causes so many people to carry thousands of dollars of debt on 
high·interest credit cards, we look at the problem as a sign of individual weakness. 
This lends credence to White's theory that the more economic language is used as a 
justification for various public-policy choices, the more likely it will be that the public 
will adopt the "selfish" value system in which economic theory is grounded. See 
White, supra note 78, at 197. People also begin to believe that their "rights" are 
violated when, in order to prevent abuse, the law lays down standards that might 
cause them some inconvenience. 
143. Thomas Jefferson was a passionate advocate of economic independence, 
which he believed was essential to a strong republic. He was opposed to the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, and he spoke out against the 
exploitation of European peasants by the aristocracy. ADRIENNE KOCH, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 170-77 (1943). He was sharply critical of the 
principles of political economy expounded by Adam Smith and preferred the work of 
the French writer of the same era, Antoine Destutt de Tracy. Id. at 181. Tracy saw 
an inevitable inequality among men caused by ownership of property, which creates 
two opposing classes-the hired and the hirers. Id. at 183. Although he saw this 
opposition of interests as necessary, he did not see it as an excuse for the blind 
acceptance of all inequalities as inevitable. ''The conclusion which I should draw from 
it ... is, that the laws should always endeavor to protect weakness; while too 
frequently they incline to favour power." Id. (quoting ANToINE DESTU'IT DE TRACY, 
A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1817». 
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consumer and card-issuer behavior. I have shown in this article 
that "neutrality" in this instance promotes specific business 
interests and encourages self-centered, acquisitive, market-
oriented values. These values are promoted at the expense of 
other long-standing cultural ideals that have always been a part 
of Western legal thought and that still find support in society at 
large, but they are difficult to express in the public sphere' 
because they spring from moral and religious sources. Because 
our morality is increasingly personalized and Americans have 
become unwilling to "impose" their values on their fellow citizens, 
we have little convincing public language that can be used to 
challenge the purportedly neutral, individually oriented ideals of 
the marketplace. But all lawmaking involves the promotion of 
certain values over others. The issue is not so much a choice 
between legal neutrality on the one hand and the promotion of 
values on the other. Instead, it is a choice of which values the law 
will promote.144 In choosing not to regulate interest rates in the 
credit card market, we have given free rein to behavioral traits 
that our society has attempted historically to control. This 
control has always meant the loss of some individual autonomy 
and freedom, but history has taught us that the loss was prefera-
ble to the alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The law must encourage standards of behavior for the 
marketplace that promote human dignity and discourage the 
abuse of weaker members of society. The current laissez-faire 
regime has encouraged credit card issuers to pursue unlimited 
profits without providing boundaries to that pursuit,145 and it has 
fueled an irrational consumerism among many credit card 
holders. It has also contributed to a cheapening of public 
144. The traditional liberal position that the state should remain neutral 
regarding moral ideas is increasingly under attack, not only by critics of liberalism, 
'but also by supporters of liberalism who believe that a liberal state must be able to 
promote some moral values. See J. BUDZISZEWSKI, TRUE TOLERANCE: LIBERALISM AND 
THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT (1992); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State 
Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L, REV. 1350 (1991). 
145. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 80. "[A] moral condemnation of great wealth 
must inform any defense of the free market, and that moral condemnation must be 
backed up with effective political action," CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE 
EUTES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 22 (1995). 
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discussions about how we should organize our common life and 
has diverted attention away from the important issue of Ameri-
can consumers' growing dependence on credit to maintain their 
lifestyles. Realistic interest rate controls send the important 
message to both card issuers and consumers that there are limits 
to what one can do to satisfy desires for money and material 
goods, as opposed to encouraging a competitive and acquisitive 
market mentality that tends to benefit the economically powerful. 
Any inconvenience a limited number of individuals might suffer 
because they stand to have fewer credit options or lower profits 
is minimal when compared with the larger societal benefits that 
would result from using the law to promote community goals 
beyond the purely economic. 
